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Thepublication in 1958 of Phillips's work (1958), which brought
out empirically an inverse and nonlinear functional relation between
the percentage changes in money wages and the rate of unemploy-
ment, made a considerable impact on the academic world. Contradic-
ting as it did the widespread, simple version of the Keynesian model,
Phillips's empirical relation suggested that the rate of inflation might
increase considerably before the goal of completely full employment
was reached. That is,if we accept the hypothesis that the Phillips
curve is stable through time, this means that in order to achieve a
lower level of unemployment (or a lower rate of inflation) we must
pay the price of increasing the rate of inflation (or raising the level of
unemployment) before we have reached the point of completely full
employment.
Phillips's original version was limited to the development of an em-
pirical model without probing deeply into its theoretical basis. It can
therefore be considered that the theoretical advances in Phillips' em-
• pirical relation began with the work of Lipsey (1960) and, subse-
• quentlyacquireda new dimension with Phelps's(1967) and
Friedman's (1968) inclusion of the concept of the expected rate of
*The views expressed in this document are entirely the responsibility of the
author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Instituto Torcuato Di Tella.
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inflation.A different line of reasoning which also gave rise to impor-
tant contributions in the analysis of the Phillips curve is connected
with Hines's work (1964) on the role of the trade unions as an ex-
planatory factor in wage demands.
The purpose of the present work is to evaluate empirically, for the d
period 1964—1974, whether these various formulations of the Phillips t
curve are applicable to the Argentine economy.
Quite apart from the numerous theoretical concepts underlying
the Phillips curve, however, the very question of the measurement of
each variable may be decided in various ways, yielding results that
are incompatible with each other. For example, in some studies the
price of labor is expressed in terms of the basic wage established by
labor contracts while in others use is made of the wages effectively
paid,which may yield different results.'Similarly, we must state
whether we are limiting ourselves to the manufacturing sector or are
speaking in terms of the whole economy.
A further example is the price variable. What should we use: the
cost-of-living index, wholesale prices, or the implicit price index? It
is usually assumed that the first mentioned has a more direct impact
on wage demands. Still a further difficulty concerns the employment t1i
variable. It is highly possible that in order to provide a better explana- ti
tion of the state of the labor market one would have to include con- 51
cealed unemployment and the rates of participation of certain groups
that make up the reserve labor force, for example, women and ci
youths of working age. Alternatively, in some versions of the Phillips S
curveattempts have been made to measure the degree of tension in
the labor market by breaking down the demand for and the supply





E=thenumber of persons employed
PV =thenumber of vacancies
M =thenumber of unemployed
One limitation of this approach is that very few countries have statis-
tical data on vacancies.
These difficulties also extend to other variables used in the Phillips
model. In these circumstances, it can be seen that the conflicting re-
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or- suits of different empirical studies may stem from the different
;ed concepts used for defining the same variables as well as from the dif-
ferent variables that are included in the Phillips functional relation.2
While it is certainly interesting to investigate the implications of
he different variable definitions, in our analysis of the Argentine case
ips the definition and selection of variables, as well as the period of time
selected, were dictated purely by the availability of statistical data.
ng Lack of more than one possible series generally prevented us from
of observing in what way the conclusions might vary as a function of
iat other variable definitions.
he The statistical series for unemployment, wages, and prices are
by those published by the National Institute of Statistics and Censuses
'ly (INDEC). Although the series for unemployment begins in July
•tte 1963, the period actually considered extends from the first half of
•Lre 1964 to the first half of 1974 because of the statistical constructions
employed. For unemployment, these data cover the percentage of
he unemployed in the Greater Buenos Aires area compared with the
It economically active population. Unemployment surveys are carried
ct out three times a year: in April, July, and October.3 In our case, we
nt took the April figure as an indicator for the first half of the year and
a- that of October for the second half; the month of July was not con-
n- sidered. For wages, we took the contractually negotiated basic wage
.5 for unskilled industrial workers in the Federal Capital as a reflection
of hourly money wages. The simple average of the six months in each
35 semester was used. For prices, the cost-of-living index for the Federal
-n Capital (corrected to remove seasonal variations) was used, again tak-
ing the average over each semester.
Finally, in all our estimates we used simple least squares. For the
models including the price variable this procedure may be vulnerable
to simultaneous equations bias since, if we take a complete system of
price equations, prices should be included as an independent variable
• in the wage equation while the money wage should be included as an
• independent variable in a price equation.
1Simple Version of the Phillips Curve
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being the percentage of unemployed industrial workers in Greater
Buenos Aires relative to the economically active population in the
months of April or October of each year.
The results obtained are as follows (the t-statistic is in brackets):
=76.90-243.18 R2 =0.16(7-1)
(3.25)(1.92) R2 =012 A
F(19) =3.67
=55.62-674.46 R2 =0.18(7-2)
(4.57)(2.03) R2 =013 A
F(19) =4.11
=-32.88+957.59 -3194.48 U-2 =0.21(7-3)




These results completely rule out the applicability of a simple ver-
sion of the Phillips curve. In expression (7—3) the rate of unemploy-
ment only explains 21 percent of the rate of change in money wages,
and the coefficients are not significantly different from zero. More-
over, the Equations (7-1) and (7-2) show a sign opposite to the one
expected for the coefficient of unemployment: the rate of growth of
money wages increases as the level of unemployment rises.
For Equation (7—3)—s =f (Ui', )—the function attains a
maximum value when the level of unemployment is 6.7 percent. It
is only above that level that the percentage variation of wages begins
to fall as the rate of unemployment increases. This result would sug-
gest that the usual Phillips functional relation only occurs beyond an
unemployment rate of 6.7 percent. However, apart from the weak
statistical basis of this conclusion, levels of unemployment above 6.7Full Employment and Price Stability in the Argentine Economy 205
percentwere only observed in two cases—April 1964 (75 percent)
and April 1972 (7.4 percent)—so the relation shown lies outside the
usual performance of the economy and thereforeis not really
relevant.
In brief, and always bearing in mind the fact that these economet-
ric estimates are far from satisfactory, the results achieved thus far
suggest that the state of the labor market, insofar as this is ade-
quately reflected by the rate of unemployment, fails to explain the
variation in money wages during the period 1964-1974.
In fact, the last functional relation (7—3) suggests that only a sub-
stantial increase in the level of unemployment to more than 6.7 per-
cent, that is, much greater than that normally experienced in the
Argentine economy, could slow the rate of increase of money wages
(to rates below 40 percent per year). Of course, in such a case we
would have to make a joint evaluation of the social cost of such high
levels of unemployment and the possible social benefits of curbing
the rate of inflation. If it is assumed that a sharp increase in unem-
ployment is the "only" way of controlling inflation, it is obvious
that the price of freeing ourselves of the latter may be socially un-
acceptable. If the Phillips option were put this way, there is little
doubt that society would rather live with inflation than maintain an
unacceptable level of unemployment.
But if the state of the labor market as measured by unemployment
rates alone does not explain the behavior of money wages, then what
are the variables that influence wage changes? Let us begin by mak-
ing an empirical analysis of the role of the expectation of inflation
in order to evaluate to what extent the rate of increase in wages is
influenced by anticipated future rates of inflation. The latter will in
turn call for a study of the manner in which expectations of future
inflation are formed. Since expectations are not directly observable a
generally accepted indirect approach is to assume that the formation
of such expectations is influenced by the past history of the real rate
of inflation. In other words, two models must be prepared simultane-
ously—one on the manner in which expectations of inflation are
formed and the other on the way in which the behavior of wages is
affected by changes in such expectations.
2The Phillips Curve, Taking Account
of Expected Inflation
Thebasic equation of the model for determining money wages on
the basis of expectations of inflation is as follows:
(7-4)
I.1 1
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where
W over the period t (negoti-
ated basic wages of unskilled industrial workers);
=averagelevel of unemployment over the period t (Greater
Buenos Aires);
=theexpected future rate of inflation projected over the
period t
In view of the lack of direct observations of price expectations,
the variable must be replaced, using a model of expectations that
employs observable statistical data. Some expectation models are
as follows.
• 2.1 STATIC EXPECTATIONS
Inthis model the expectations for the period t are (approximately)
the same as the actual rate of inflation in that period:
(7-5)
Substituting (7-5) in (7- 4), we have:
+ai +a2
In our calculations,the cost-of-living index in the Federal
Capital was estimated on the basis of two assumed trends. The first




Inthis case it is assumed that what is important is the moving
average of the percentage changes in prices that occur up to the time
of the increases in money wages (or wage negotiations); in other
words, during the year preceding the wage increase. The limitation of
this model is that it may reflect either the formation of future ex-
• pectations or the process of adjusting wages to past inflation.
The second assumption on the percentage variation in prices is the
following:
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Inthis case, is defined on the basis of the percentage variation
in the prices prevailing at the same time as the increases in wages.5
Again this model does not clearly show a causal relationship between
prices and wages. The introduction of a one-semester time lag would
be necessary to show that the percentage variation in the cost of
living precedes that in money wages.6
For the period under study, we developed three equations
(with and The best results were provided by
the following expressions with the t-statistic given in brackets:










From the results provided by the three estimations (including
.4
which is not shown), the following conclusions can be drawn:
(a) the variableis of no significance and in one case its coefficient
¼
isperverse, as in our simple Phillips model;8 (b) the expectations
variable is significant in all the examples, showing that the percentage
change in the cost-of-living index does play a role in determining
• money wages; (c) in all the examples the autocorrelation in the resid-
ual is significant at the 5 percent level, which suggests that we can
improve the specification of the model by introducing additional
variables; (d) in Equations (7-6) and (7—7) the coefficient of expecta-
tions of inflation is not significantly different from unity, which
would permit acceptance of the Friedman-Phelps hypothesis, in the
sense that it is not valid to assume that money illusion exists in the
• short term. At the same time the hypothesis that demand pressures,
working through the proxy determine money wages is rejected
since the coefficient of this variable is not significantly different
from zero.
In sum, in accordance with this simple version of expectations of
inflation we may draw the conclusion that the percentage change in
I11
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real wagesaffects the behavior of the labor market (since the coeffi-
cient of is not different from unity), although we cannot accept
the hypothesis that the change in wages is a stable function of the
rate of unemployment since it appears that the behavior of money
wages is independent of the level of unemployment disequilibrium in
the labor market.
So far, we have developed an oversimplified version of the forma-
tion of expectations because we assume that the knowledge of the
recent or actual rate of inflation is sufficient for their formulation.
However, it seems more reasonable to assume that the past history of
inflation rates plays a role in the formation of expectations. More-
over, as discussed earlier, the use of = does not enable us
to determine whether this reflects a static model of expectations or a
mechanism for adjusting money wages to past inflation. Therefore,
other models of expectations are needed for a more detailed analysis.
In general, the following models of the formation of expectations9
have been used.
2.2EXTRAPOLATIVE MODEL
where0 is the rate of extrapolation.
This equation shows that the expected rate of inflation that exists
at the moment t is equal to the rate of change in prices in the period
t plus a correction factor through which account is taken of the
recent trend in the rate of inflation. If U > 0 it is expected that the
growth differential between the present rate of inflation and the past
rate will continue in the future, while if U < 0 it is expected that the
reverse will follow (regressive expectations). The special case U =0
corresponds to the model developed earlier for =
Substituting the equation for the formation of expectations in
(7-4),wehave
U1
However, this model of the formation of expectations is unsatis.
factory and suffers from the same defect as the model of static
expectations because of the fact that it only takes account of current
inflation and that of the preceding period; in other words, it does not
take account of the information that extensive past experience may
offer.•1
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2.3 ADAPTIVE MODEL
1 (7-8)
where y is the rate of adaptation.
As is well known Equation (7-8) can be shown to be a weighted
geometric average of all past rates of inflation. The equation shows
that the change in expectations
— is equal to a fraction y
of the error of prediction between what was expected in the pre-
ceding period and what actually occurred in that period. If y is equal
to 1, only the current rate of inflation is important—again
= If yisclose to zero the weightings y(1 —decrease slowly,
thus taking into account a long history of prices. With -ycloseto 1
the weightings fall rapidly and memory is short.
Equation (7-8) gives the following result:
-(1-v) = 7 (7-9)
Usinga program prepared by the Central Bank we obtained the
values of for -y from 0.1 to 1.0.10
For each value of y and its corresponding we estimated the
values of using least squares. Taking the equation in which R2 is
at its maximum (-y0.7):"
=-10.45+ 46.98 +1.243 R2 =0.78(7-10)




Thus in this adaptive expectations model the present semester and
the previous one represent 91 percent of the total weightings of the
past history of price changes.12
From the results of Equation (7-10) the following conclusions can
be drawn:
(i)The coefficient ofis not significantly different from zero,
thereby corroborating the previous results.
(ii)The test of the hypothesis that the coefficient of =1yields
a t-statistic =1.41for 18 degrees of freedom, showing that we
cannot reject the hypothesis that it is equal to 1 at a signifi-
cance level of 5 percent.I
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(iii)As compared to Equations (7-6) and (7-7), although the im-
proves slightly, we still cannot reject the hypothesis of autocor- r
relation,although in this case we are also unable to accept it at
a significance level of 1 percent. This result again invalidates the
hypothesis test for the estimated coefficients and once more
suggests the need for improving the specification of the model
by introducing other variables.
The unemployment variable in the Phillips curve attempts to illus-
trate the role of excess demand in determining money wages and can
therefore be visualized as one means of showing—of course, in a very
primitive and crude manner—the effects that a policy based on the
control of demand has on the rate of wage inflation. Insofar as that
variable reflects excess aggregate demand, the fact that the coeffi-
cientis not significant points to the limitations for the Argentine
economy of using this variable as a means of curbing inflation.
Furthermore, the results of Equation (7-10), although limited by
the autocorrelation suggested by the Durbin-Watson statistic, do sug-
gest that for the period 1964—1974 workers were not affected by the
money illusion even though the coefficient of adaptation is greater
than unity.'3
Of course, the foregoing conclusion about the role of the expected
rate of inflation in determining the rate of change in money wages
must be examined with the greatest care in view of the existing theo-
retical limitations about the true model adopted by economic units
in forming their future expectations. There is no doubt that the past
history of prices is one important factor to be taken into considera-
tion. But even if we accept this simple general rule, many unknown
quantities remain. First, what is the right weighting structure that
ought to accompany each of the past prices? In our case the results
suggest that only the current semester and the past semester really
count. It is highly possible that for the hectic period 1964—1974 with
six presidents, three of whom acquired office through revolutions or
coups d'etat and three through constitutional elections, so short a
memory may provide an accurate picture of real economic behavior.
But it is also highly probably that by taking prices alone we may be
overlooking much more important sociopolitical variables. In this
connection Solow (1969), in his analysis of the United States and
England, suggests that these institutional factors should be consid-
ered as irregular deviations from the systematic relation based on the
past history of prices. Obviously, political trends in Argentina seem
to suggest that such deviations are the rule rather than the exception,
which in all probability caused the economic agents to accept certainr Full Employment and Price Stability in the Argentine Economy 211
hypothesesof behavior based on past experience regarding the inter-
relationship between political change and the economic model.
Second, we may accept intuitively the idea that percentage variations
in past prices fit the Argentine case, with its almost permanent his-
tory of fluctuating inflation, much more readily than the absolute
level of prices. But it can also be argued that what really counts are
the variations in the historical trend of the rate of inflation (approxi-
mately 27 percent per year in (1950—1972) in view of the fluctua-
tions around this rate during that period. For example, in 1964-1974
the average rate of inflation was 28 percent per year, falling in 1969
to 7.6 percent, rising again in 1970—1971, racheting upward between
the first half of 1972 and the first half of 1973 to 71.5 percent and
then dropping sharply to 17.9 percent between the first half of 1973
and the first half of 1974.
All these observations serve to place the role of the expected rate
of inflation, and in particular the model of the formation of expec-
tations, in its proper perspective.
3The Phillips Curve and Incomes Policy
Theresults based on the model of adaptive expectations, which
roughly coincide with those of the less sophisticated model of static
expectations, lead to the conclusion that in the short term there is
no traditional tradeoff; the Argentine economy is not faced with the
well-known inverse relation between variations in money wages and
the level of unemployment. However, expectations regarding the
future rate of inflation have a significant effect on the behavior of
wages, an effect that is nearly independent of the level of unem-
ployment in the labor market. Hence, a policy that operates on
inflationary expectations such as an incomes policy, could be suc-
cessful.'4In other words, incomes policy may serve as a way of
preventing the past history of prices from being a suitable means of
predicting the future inflation.
This hypothesis leads us to an analysis of the role played by the
different incomes policies followed in the period 1964-1974. The
first problem that arises in such an analysis is to define those periods
in which an incomes policy was actually in force. This is not an easy
task, because, although nearlyall the governments formally an-
nounced price and wage controls, in several cases they went no
further than a formal declaration, particularly as regards price fixing.
Throughout the period a common practice of the governments was
to fix maximum prices for products making up the family consump-
tion basket as well as to decide wage increases unilaterally.
However, the behavior of prices and wages clearly shows a lack of212 Short Term Macroeconomic Policy in Latin America
effectiveobedience to these regulations. For this reason, we must dis-
tinguish between periods of effective controls and those with mere
formal declarations of controls.
In view of the confused socioeconomic situation during the years
under study, we are obliged to use two criteria simultaneously for
defining periods when an incomes policy was effectively applied. The
first is the existence of a series of formal regulations on prices and
wages. The second is the respect shown by the different social groups
for these regulations, recognizing in this manner the political power
of the government as an arbitrator in the income distribution strug-
gle. The second criterion introduces a high degree of subjectivity into
the analysis.
In view of the above criteria, we have selected two subperiods dur-
ing which incomes policy generally is considered to have had some
effect. The first subperiod is associated with Ongania-Krieger Vasena
and runs from the second half of 1967 to the second half of 1969.
Although the fact that the government was changed as a result of the
incidents in Cordoba in May 1969 sheds some doubt on the inclusion
of the second half of 1969, we feel that the regulations governing
prices and wages continued to be effective. The second, and much
more recent experience in the field of incomes policies, is connected
with the Cámpora-Perdn-Gelbard period and runs from the second
half of 1973 to the first half of 1974. For the first period we used
the dummy variable(1 for the Krieger Vasena period and zero for
the remainder of the period) and for the second .the dummy variable
'2(1for the Gelbard period and zero for the remainder of the pe-
riod). The purpose of introducing a different dummy variable for each
of these periods, instead of a single dummy variable for the whole
period covered by incomes policy, was to reflect the different insti-
tutional contexts in which these incomes policies were applied.15
Table 7-1 shows the results using and (corresponding
to r= 0.7),both including and excluding The table shows that
the inclusion of the dummy variable improves the results of Equation
(7—10) by eliminating the autocorrelation (at the 5 percent level).
The coefficient of determination adjusted for degrees of freedom
(Ri) increases from 0.76 to 0.86. The price expectations variable
continues to he significant and does not differ from unity. The elim-
ination of the variable U1 generally improves the estimates.
An interesting point is raised by the different signs of the incomes
policy. For the Krieger Vasena period (II: 1967 to II: 1969), as a
result of the application of an incomes policy, the annual rate of
growth of money wages was 11 percent lower than would have been
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thedummy variable is positive, thus indicating that the incomes
policy was directed toward increasing money wages at an annual rate f
17.86percent higher than that achieved without that policy. Since
prices were also controlled, the overall real effect of the two income
policies cannot fully be estimated if only these coefficients are taken
into account. Nevertheless, since there was a sharp drop in the annual
rate of inflation in both periods the figures would tend to suggest
that the incomes policies in question took different approaches to
distribution. Whereas Krieger Vasena attempted to hold down both
prices and wages by his income policy, Gelbard tried to make a lower
rate of increase in prices compatible with a higher annual growth rate
in wages through his anti-inflationary program. We must point out
that these results are insufficient for us to express an opinion on the
ultimate redistributive impact of the prices and wages policy because
that would call for the formulation of a simultaneous equation
model with prices and wages playing in turn the role of dependent
and independent variables. Furthermore, the Krieger Vasena period,
which covers five semesters, was characterized by a sharp increase in
wages in the first semester and a slower increase subsequently. There-
fore, its coefficient, which reflects both phases, can only show that
the last stage, with a lower annual growth rate of wages, canceled out
the sharp initial positive effect. In contrast, the shortness of the
Gelbard period, which covers only two semesters, may be insufficient
for making an accurate evaluation of the direction and long-run
effects of the incomes policy.'6
In any event, and even in the light of the foregoing observations, it
is obvious that an incomes policy need not necessarily be associated
with a distributive scheme involving 'the containment of wages. On
the contrary, the central theme of any anti-inflationary scheme based
on incomes policy continues to be the guidelines on income distribu-
tion proposed to the community by the government.
This distributive variable is of special relevance for a country that
has functioned in an inflationary setting for a long period of time. In
such a long-standing context of inflation, the different social groups
have produced sufficient antibodies to prevent any anti-inflationary
policy from causing real deterioration in their relative position in
terms of income distribution. Thus, after a long experience of
stop-go efforts to stabilize prices, the system of relative prices ceases
to be regarded mainly as an instrument for assigning productive re-
sources and becomes the central mechanism in income distribution.
This stop-go approach to anti-inflationary policies tends to convince
the economic groups that the short term is of prime importance in
the distributive struggle and that their natural means of self-defense
-- — ——S - - -I
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arebased mainly on relative prices, since possible compensatory
schemes based on fiscal policy, requiring a longer period in which to
operate, do not usually have a lasting effect.
The high significance of the price expectations and incomes policy
coefficients and the insignificant contribution of the unemployment
variable suggest that wage inflation in Argentina develops in a con-
text of continuous redistributive friction between social groups with
different capacities for domination of the market. This implies that
if an economic policy program is to be successful, it is not enough to
explain its distributive targets. The government must also have suffi-
cient political backing to impose new rules of the game for income
distribution. For those countries with a long tradition of respect for
the electoral aspect of politics, the questioning of the government's
power of arbitration does not imply any breaking of the institutional
norms that govern the running of a country. However, in Argentina
an important means of questioning, government decisions has been
the weakening of the very bases of the representative institutions,
thereby creating conditions that lead to the subsequent overthrow
of governments. For this reason, governments anxious for their sur-
vival shirk their role of distributive arbitration and become mere
instruments for rubber-stamping the demands of those groups with
the political capacity to impose their own distributive guidelines.
This sets in motion a circular process of attempted redistribution
that feeds inflation and culminates in the questioning of the very role
of the government. This mechanism, which was clearly described by
Guillermo O'Donnell, lies outside the immediate scope of this work,
and for this reason we shall not dwell on it. The point to which we
do wish to draw attention is that, other things being equal, the tradi-
tional assumption of ceteris paribus as regards the social, political,
and institutional variable eliminates from the analysis, for a period as
hectic as that of 1964—1974, factors that are of major importance in
the dynamics of inflation. We do not believe that a satisfactory ex-
planation of those dynamics is possible unless the entire range of fac-
tors affecting them is covered by an interdisciplinary approach.
4The Phillips Curve and Trade
Union Pressure
Theforegoing remarks are linked with the sociological explanation
of the dynamics of inflation and were set out in Argentina by Javier
Villanueva among others. In this view inflation is the result of the
distributive struggle among social sectors with some degree of domi-
nation of the market.
In the specific matter of the Phillips curve, the analysis made soI
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far wouldbe incomplete without considering the role of union ag-
gressiveness in determining money wages. For this analysis a defini- (
tionof aggressiveness in terms of variations in the percentage level of
union membership (Hines's approach) is not suitable since, as a result
of the nature of Argentine labor legislation, that percentage, which is
not only high but also stable over time, does not reflect any increase
or fall in union pressure." For this reason we shall define this variable
in terms of working days lost as a result of strikes and stoppages (the
Godfrey approach). The Ministry of Labor publishes statistics on the
labor conflicts recorded in the Federal Capital, indicating the number
of cases, the workers affected, and the number of days lost. This sta-
tistical series covers both strikes (temporary interruptions in work
that last for more than one working day) and stoppages (interrup-
tions that do not exceed a working day).'8 While the annual figures
are broken down on the basis of economic sectors and the causes of
the labor conflicts (economic improvements, wage claims, dismissal
and suspension of workers, disciplinary measures, organization and
conditions at working places), such a breakdown unfortunately is
not available on a monthly basis. Therefore, this variable is not lim-
ited to the industrial sector, as would be required to bring it in line
with the money wages concept, but covers all the productive sectors
and the whole range of economic and noneconomic causes of strikes
and stoppages.'9 The working days lost variable, which is assumed to
express the degree of union pressure, was estimated as:
s_s tt-2
whereSt is the total number of days lost in the semester t. The series
covers 1964—1971 since these particular statistics were not prepared
after the latter year.
We have used instead of the absolute level 3tfortwo reasons.
The first is the likely seasonal nature of the series since the first half
of the year includes the holiday period during which there is less like-
lihood of labor conflicts. The variableis, therefore, found by link-
ingwith 5t-2andnot with the previous semester (Sf1). The
second reason is a more delicate one since it is assumed that union
aggressiveness is a function of the changes in intensity of the conflict
and not the total number of disputes that occur in the semester. A
possible justification for this assumption is that wages are usually
fixed unilaterally by the government or, if this is not the case, there
is at least stronger government pressure to keep wage increases within
its guidelines, which may not necessarily have been fixed publiclyFull Employment and Price Stability in the Argentine Economy 217
andexplicitly. In this context, a likely model of behavior would be
that the unions, in order to obtain higher wages, would try to create
an escalating climate of conflict so as to win a more favorable atti-
tude from the government. This suggests that the rate of increase in
money wages should move in the same direction as the increase in
the rate of union aggressiveness, measured by
The equation estimated for the period 1964-1 971 is as follows:20







We originally estimated an equation similar to (7—15) including
The results show that the latter's coefficient has a sign different
from that expected, that it is not significant, and that it introduces
some multicollinearity. For this reason, we excluded that variable
from expression (7—15). The results thus achieved are clear and com-
patible with our previous estimates:
(i)the coefficient of adaptation to price expectations does not
differ from unity;
(ii)the dummy variablewhich expresses the income policy dur-
ing the Krieger Vasena period, has the expected sign and is sig-
nificantly different from zero;
(iii)the proxy variable of union pressure has the expected sign
and is significant at 5 percent.21It is noted that an annual in-
crease of 10 percent in such pressure through strikes and stop-
pages gives an annual increase in money wages of 2.4 percent;
(iv)the variable is not closely linked with the employment
situation in the labor market, which suggests that union pres-
sure is exercised somewhat independently of the level of excess
demand for labor.22
5Conclusions on the Applicability of the
Phillips Curve to the Argentine Economy
Inour empirical analysis of the Phillips curve for the Argentine
economy for the period 1964—1974 we started with the simplest
version:
+a2I
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andobserved not only that the state of the labor market is not a sig-
nificant variable in the determination of the rate of growth of money r
wagesbut also that its behavior is the opposite of that expected—the
level of unemployment increases with the rate of increase of wages.
Since the econometric estimates based on the previous equation
were far from satisfactory, the second step was to show the effect
of the expected rate of inflation on the behavior of money wages.
For this purpose, we first had to formulate a model of the expecta-
tions of the rate of inflation and then substitute the expected rate of
inflation in the wages equation. To this end, we began by defining a
very simple model of static expectations. The results obtained con-
firm the low level of significance of the variablewhile at the same
time showing the important role of the rate of inflation in explaining
• the rate of change in wages.
• Since this model only took account of present inflation, ignoring
• I the impact of earlier history of rates of inflation, a model of adaptive
expectations was used in which
In this model, the closer that y is to unity, the shorter is the
memory of the economic units and the greater is the influence of
the more recent periods in the formation of the expected rates of
inflation.
The estimates made, while again discarding the contribution of
serve, on one hand, to bring out the significance of the expected rate
of inflation and, on the other hand, to show the importance of the
present and previous semesters in the formation of expectations—the
value ofis maximized in the wage equation when y= 0.7.
An important limitation of the previous estimates is the presence
of autocorrelation in the residuals, which makes it difficult to carry
out meaningful tests of the significance of the estimated coefficients.
This also suggests that the estimated model could be improved by
introducing new variables. To this end, we introduced two dummies
representing experiences with incomes policy in the period 1964—
1974—that of Krieger Vasena and that of Gelbard.
The results obtained again rule out the importance ofand high-
light the significance of expectations of inflation and of incomes poi-
icies, which together account for 86 percent of the change in money
wages. The elimination of the autocorrelation in the residuals made it
possible to accept confidently the hypothesis that the coefficient of
adaptation does not differ from unity and that while the incomes
policy of Krieger Vasena was used to slow down the growth rate ofFull Employment and Price Stability in the Argentine Economy 219
moneywages, that of Gelbard helped during its short period of appli-
cation to accelerate that growth.
The verification that the level of unemployment (Ui) is not a sig-
nificant variable in the explanation of the rate of change in money
wages led finally to the formulation of another model in which wages
were influenced by union aggressiveness
+a2 +a3
The results of this model, which were applied only to the period
1964—1971 owing to limitations in statistical sources, show that
the coefficient of does not differ from unity, that the incomes
policy of Krieger Vasena was significant, and that union aggressive-
ness helped to increase the rate of growth of wages. In particular,
it is observed that union pressure is largely independent of the em-
ployment situation in the labor market.
In sum, the estimates carried out for the Argentine economy for
the period 1964—1974 reject the well-known tradeoff between a
lower level of unemployment and a higher rate of growth of money
wages. In contrast, the expected rate of inflation and the degree of
pressure exercised by unions do influence the rate of growth of
money wages.
The long-standing inflation that is characteristic of the Argentine
economy apparently has served to create in certain social groups the
necessary antibodies that help prevent the germs of inflation from
affecting them adversely. In the labor sector this process took
place without the need for any inoculation with an explicit dose of
indexation (adjustment for inflation) of money wages. The unitary
coefficient of adaptation to expected rates of inflation shows the im-
possibility of continually fooling wage earners through a rising rate of
inflation. Not only are they not subject to monetary illusion, but in a
stop-go context of contradictory economic policy programs, wage
earners form their expectations of inflation on the basis of a model
in which a 90 percent weight is given to what occurs in the current
and previous semesters.
This capacity of wage earners to transfer the expected increase in
prices to wages, together with the upward pressure exercised by
union militancy, suggests that the explanation of Argentine wage in-
flation cannot be found in the traditional Phillips curve interpretation
of excess demand for labor as a catalytic factor. If we accept that the
latter variable is adequately represented by the level of unemploy-
ment, the acceleration of inflation takes place independently of the
state of the labor market. On the contrary, Argentine inflation is'1
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morereadily explained by expectations and the influence exercised
on the level of prices by aspirations about the distribution of national t4
income that go beyond the global capacity of the country to satisfy
them. These aspirations were forced into compatibility in a context
of stable prices on the occasions on which the government rose above
conflicting aspirations and directed and controlled the distributive
struggle. In the period 1964-1974 this occurred on two occasions: S
in 1967—1969 (Ongania-Krieger Vasena), where as mentioned earlier v
de Pablo has argued that fiscal restraint was used as an instrument to
affect expectations, and in 1973-1974 (Perón-Gelbard), where wages
p
wereraised and prices fixed. But it is also possible to see that the a
socioeconomic strain, which such stabilizing shocks implied, in a
country that is accustomed to thinking and operating in terms of a
permanent and fluctuating inflation led, once this controlling capa-
city had been exhausted and had disappeared, to a subsequent period ta
of galloping inflation of the type experienced in 1971-1972 and
from the second half of 1974 to 1977. In other words, although the o
incomes policy may shift the Phillips curve toward the left, it tends
to go back toward the right.
This suggests that, for a country that is accustomed to average T
rates of inflation of 25 to 30 percent per year, it is not advisable to a
apply a sharp brake to inflation because the strains that accumulate
during that brief interregnum of price stability later lead to a corres- ti
ponding price explosion. Thus, just as itis not easy for a country
with price stability to adjust to the situation prevailing under infla- U
tiori, it is no less difficult if the process of adaptation is reversed. it
Although the incomes policies of Krieger Vasena and Gelbard h
seem to have been successful during their short period of application, 0
when they are examined in a wider context it seems that they were ti
only transitory examples of repressed inflation. These results suggest ci
that if the capacity of the government to act as arbitrator in the dis- ai
tributive struggle is exercised gradually for a certain period of time, it 0
may be possible not only "to educate" the economic units as to how
to operate with a certain degree of price stability but also to reduce
the strain on distribution and to cushion the natural erosion of the t
arbitrating power of the government, provided that this can be done
in a context of steadily expanding the income available for distri-
bution. It does not seem advisable to us, nor politically viable for a e:
country that for twenty-five years has known no other way of deal-
ing with income distribution than through changes in relative prices, la
to change these patterns of behavior suddenly, since it is highly pos-
sible that with suddenly stable prices the majority of the social to
groups will all feel cheated simultaneously. In such a context of col-Full Employment and Price Stability in the Argentine Economy 221
lectivedissatisfaction the incomes policy becomes a brief period of
transition that may terminate with the expulsion of the arbitrator
when his capacity for enforcing the rules of the distributive game is
t exhausted politically.
e This view of the dynamics of inflation has been taken in a context
e of moderate and fluctuating growth resulting from the external
sector's limited capacity to satisfy a level of production compatible
with full employment. Full employment implies that the determi-
nants of money wages cannot be analyzed in the context of a closed
economy, such as that depicted by the Phillips curve, but that their
e analysis must take account of the relation between the exchange poi-
a icy followed (fixed versus flexible rates of exchange) and the internal
f and external inflation differential.
To the extent that the rate of growth of domestic prices in a con-
text of fixed exchange rates exceeds world inflation, the interna-
tional competitive capacity of the country will be affected as a result
of the overvaluation of its currency. The progressive tendency to-
ward external imbalance arising from such a state of affairs will lead
to subsequent devaluation in order to find equilibrium once more.
The Argentine experience shows that the last-mentioned measure, if
accompanied by a policy for containing money wages, gives rise to a
redistribution of income that is unfavorable to wage earners. Since
they have a bigger marginal propensity to spend than nonwage earn-
ers, devaluation depresses the level of domestic demand and with it
the level of production and employment in view of the low elastic-
ity of supply of export products in the short term. This mechanism
indicates that external equilibrium is achieved in the short term more
often through the contractionary effect of devaluation on the domes-
tic demand for imports and exports than through the effect of a
change in relative prices. In the short term, the final result of devalu-
• ation will be an upswing in inflation and a slowing down in the rate
of growth of the product and employment.
The- process described above is obviously most applicable to the
policy of fixed exchange rates followed up to 1964. From then on
this type of policy was cast aside and the government began to apply
more flexible exchange rates, including as part of them concealed de.
valuations in the form of reductions in taxes on exports. To some
extent, however, the devaluations of March 1967 and the end of
1971, suggest that the rate of exchange was not adjusted fully in re-
lation to the disparity between domestic and world inflation. This
lag in the real rate of exchange and its subsequent adjustment helps
to explain the slowing down in the rate of growth of economic activ-
ity arid employment in the period following the 1971 devaluation.
I•1
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Themost important contribution of the new scheme based on a
certain degree of exchange flexibility, compared with that applied
in the period preceding 1964, is that, while in the latter period the
adjustment to external equilibrium was associated with contractions
in the absolute level of the gross domestic product (e.g., 1952, 1959,
and 1962-1963), in the period beginning in 1964 the increases and
decreases in the rate of growth of the GDP did not involve a drop in
its absolute level.
The whole range of queries raised in the analysis by the introduc-
tion of the external sector would extend this chapter far beyond its
immediate scope and for this reason the interested reader is referred
to the numerous existing works on the subject, for example those by
Diaz Alejandro (1965), Mallon and Sourrouille (1975) and the author
(1974).
NOTES
1.Mackay and Hart (1974) show that the Phillips curve, expressed in terms
of contractual wage rates, may yield different results from those obtained if
wages effectively paid are used. In England thefirst would yield a higher
Phillips curve in the postwar period. Contractual wages may be more suitable for
measuring the influence of the labor market on collective agreements; whereas
the wages effectively paid more suitable for measuring demand pressures.
2. Rothschild (1971:274) presents an interesting table that shows the dif-
ferent results obtained in terms of unemployment levels for a constant rate of
change in money wages by varying the period of time chosen, the structure of
4
themodel, and introducing additional variables.
3. For a description of their methodology see the regular INDEC publica-
tions on unemployment.
4. This form of measurement, although it has the advantage of eliminating
seasonal changes, has a disadvantage in that it includes superimpositions on the
percentage variations in each semester, and therefore, may introduce autocorre-
lation into the residuals.
5. The series for the half year was adjusted to reflect annual percentage vari-
ations in order to make it compatible with the other statistical series.
6. Perry's (1964) analysis for the United States concludes that with
a time lag of three months, provides the best estimate of IMVt.
7. Farrar-Glauber's multicollinearity test.




9.See Turnovsky and Wachter (1972). t
10. Since this is an infinite series, we truncated the calculation at 20 periods,
at which point for y =0.1Full Employment and Price Stability in the Argentine Economy 223
i=20
i=o
(in our case the periods are semesters). In this case the values of -y were recalcu-
lated in order to make the previous sum equal to unity. For i20 the sum
amounts to unity from y =0.25upward (when y =0.2this sum is 0.99).
11. Replacing Uj1 with does not change the results, for the highest
value of (0.76)for y0.7 is maintained and the coefficient of is 1.249.
The inclusion of and however, introduces a high degree of multi.
collinearity.
12. In Canada, a more stable country with respect to both politics and prices,
a maximum R2 is also obtained when y =0.7.See Vanderkamp's (1972) anal-
ysis of the period 1949-1968.
13. At this point the limitations of an estimate model based on a single equa-
tion are seen more clearly. If we had estimated the following model of simulta-
neous equations: X); Y), where X and Y are other
independent variables, then we would be in a position to see the effect of the
changes in prices on wages, and subsequently of the latter on prices, in order to
observe whether the rate of inflation tends toward equilibrium at a finite rate.
14. J.C. de Pablo (1972) has suggested that the reduction in the government
deficit in the Krieger Vasena period was not undertaken as a method of attack.
ing inflation through the demand side, but through its effects in the formation
of inflationary expectations, given that many important sectors of the economy
tend to associate a larger government deficit with higher rates of inflation. In
this sense restrictive monetary and fiscal policy contribute to reduce inflation
through their effects on expectations.
15. Another approach would be to estimate the wage equation for periods in
which an incomes policy was applied and for those in which there was none, as
well as for the whole period, and then to test the assumption that the wage equa-
tion remained stable during the entire period, independently of whether or not
an incomes policy was applied. See Parkin, Summer, and Jones (1972).
16. For a detailed analysis of income distribution in this period see de Pablo
(1974).
17. A detailed criticism of the use of the rate of change in the percentage of
the labor force who are members of unions as an indicator of union militancy
can be found in Purdy and Zis (1973).
18. "Conflictos de Trabajo," Ministerio de Trabajo, Dirección Nacional de
Recursos Humanos, Division Estadisticas Sociales, various annual issues.
19. The series on stoppages is expressed in man-hours lost, which were con-
verted to working days on the basis of the assumption that a normal working
day is equal to eight hours.
20. The variable corresponds to a value y =0.7.The replacement of
with raises the coefficient DW to the area of indeterminateness at
the 5 percent level.
21. When we replaced withand we obtained unsatisfactory re-
suits for the coefficients.
I_
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(24.48) (1.93) (
Thereis even more lack of dependence between the level of unemployment and
the number of conflicts that occurred in the semester (St). The correlation coef-
ficient is 0.05.
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